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Introduction
There is no shortage of theoretical models of employee stock option (ESO) value in the academic literature (see, e.g., Hemmer et al. 1994, and Carpenter 1998) . Still, for a variety of reasons (e.g., the difficulty in assessing the empirical validity of these models) many firms use the Black-Scholes model to value their ESO, although ESO clearly violate important assumptions underlying this model (e.g., Black-Scholes assumes a diffusion process and values European calls, whereas in reality stock prices may jump and nearly all ESOs are American calls).
While the decision to use the Black-Scholes model may be controversial, there is little disagreement that given that decision, a key parameter underlying the fair value of options is the expected volatility of the underlying stock price. For example, Brenner and Subrahmanyam (1994) show that for options whose strike price equals the forward price of the stock, option value is proportional to volatility. Thus, a change in the volatility parameter will yield the same percentage change in the value of the option (e.g., a decrease in expected volatility from 30 percent to 27 percent will reduce estimated option value by 10 percent).
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 123, Accounting for Stock-
Based Compensation, guides that when estimating the fair value of options granted to employees "the assumptions about expected volatility … should be based on historical experience, adjusted for publicly available information that may indicate ways in which the future is reasonably expected to differ from the past" (para. 251). SFAS No. 123 further states, "In some circumstances, identifiable factors may indicate that unadjusted historical experience is a relatively poor predictor of future experience" (para. 276). This caveat is underscored repeatedly in the statement, including in para. 278: "The Board does not intend for an entity to base option values on historical average option lives, stock volatility, or dividends … without considering the extent to which historical experience reasonably predicts future experience." Moreover, para.
285 specifically guides that the entity should consider "the mean-reversion tendency of volatilities" in estimating expected volatility.
Thus, while SFAS No. 123 directs that estimates of expected volatility be based on historical experience, it clearly indicates that other available information should be considered as well. This provides firms with significant discretion in estimating the expected volatility of their stock price and thus the value of ESOs. Furthermore, enforcement actions against firms reporting unexpectedly low expected volatility and consequently low pro-forma ESO expense are unlikely, as the stock option value "is a projection of a financial item entitled to safe harbor protections, as are the underlying assumptions" (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 1993).
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Given the flexibility inherent in estimating stock-price volatility and the importance of this assumption in determining ESO expense, one may expect firms to manage the volatility estimate. Yet, prior studies (e.g., Aboody et al. 2003, and Balsam et al. 2003) report insignificant correlations between the volatility assumption and proxies for firm incentives to understate the pro-forma option expense.
This study investigates the determinants of the expected volatility assumption using a new approach. Its purpose is twofold. The first is to examine the extent to which companies follow the guidance of SFAS No. 123 and use forward-looking information in addition to the readily available historical volatility in estimating expected volatility. More importantly, the second purpose is to investigate the cross-sectional variation in the tendency of firms to incorporate such information. In particular, are firms more likely to incorporate forward-looking information when that information implies low volatility and hence small option expense? If so, are corporate executives more likely to incorporate forward-looking information that indicates small option expense when their option holdings or the intensity of ESO granting are relatively large?
Examining these questions requires a measure that reflects forward-looking expected volatility information. For companies with traded call or put options, such a measure can be derived from observed option prices. Specifically, by inverting the option pricing formula, one is able to estimate the implied stock price volatility used by investors in setting the option price.
In an efficient capital market, this estimate reflects both historical and forward-looking information. Thus, the incremental relationship between disclosed and implied volatilities, after controlling for historical volatility, should indicate the extent to which disclosed volatility contains forward-looking expected volatility information.
We find that managers use both historical and implied volatilities in determining the expected volatility parameter used in the calculation of option values and thus option expense.
This finding appears to indicate that managers are literally following the dictum in SFAS No. 123 that they ought to incorporate both historical and forward-looking information in the estimation of stock price volatility. Further investigation, however, demonstrates that the weight assigned to implied volatility is significant only when implied volatility is low relative to historical volatility (i.e., when using implied volatility results in a small option expense); the weight on implied volatility is insignificant when implied volatility is high relative to historical volatility. One way to interpret this finding is that managers use the discretion in SFAS No. 123 regarding incorporating forward-looking information into the expected volatility estimate opportunistically to underreport option expense. In support of this interpretation we also find that managerial incentives play a key role in this opportunism. Managers estimate volatility in an opportunistic fashion primarily when their option holdings are large or when the firm belongs to an industry with high ESO granting intensity.
Our study helps reconcile a perplexing set of results in the extant accounting literature.
Specifically, on one hand prior research shows that firms manage the pro-forma option expense.
For example, Murphy (1996) and Baker (1999) find that in preparing proxy statements' disclosures, firms opportunistically select the option valuation method (fair value versus potential realizable value) to reduce perceived managerial compensation. Further, Yermack (1998) and Aboody et al. (2003) investigate specific assumptions underlying the Black-Scholes model and find that "companies shorten the expected lives of stock options and unilaterally apply discounts to the Black-Scholes formula" (Yermack) , and "firms that have CEOs with perceived excessive pay understate option value estimates by assuming shorter option lives" (Aboody et al.) . On the other hand, prior research fails to show that firms exploit the flexibility in estimating stock-price volatility to manage option expense. For example, Aboody et al. (2003, p. 25) conclude that their results provide "no evidence that concerns about perceived profitability and political costs of executive pay motivate firms to manage downward expected stock volatility."
Using a new methodology that involves comparing the coefficients on historical and implied volatilities in explaining expected volatility, we document that corporate executives exploit discretion in SFAS No. 123 to understate expected stock-price volatility when valuing stock options. Furthermore, this behavior relates to managerial incentives to understate option expense. Our findings thus resolve an apparent inconsistency in prior research findings, as well as highlight a potential concern associated with allowing corporate executives substantial discretion in estimating stock-option values in general and expected stock-price volatility in particular.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the empirical tests. Section 3 outlines the sample selection procedure and defines the variables. Section 4 presents the empirical findings, and Section 5 concludes.
Development of the Empirical Tests
To test our first research question, the one concerning whether firms follow the guidance in SFAS No. 123 and use both historical and forward looking information in deriving expected volatility, we estimate the following regression:
Where, the dependent variable, σ D , is the disclosed stock-price volatility parameter used by the firm in calculating the option expense, α indu,year is an industry-year fixed effect, σ H is historical volatility, and σ I is implied volatility.
Conceptually, in an efficient capital market implied volatility should perform better than historical volatility in predicting future stock price volatility because it is derived from option prices which reflect both historical and forward-looking information. However, because investors do not necessarily use the Black-Scholes model in setting option prices, implied volatility (which is derived by equating the Black-Scholes formula with the observed option price) may measure market expectations of future volatility with error. In fact, while research in finance generally finds that implied volatility is better than historical volatility in forecasting 2 To verify that the difference between our findings and those of Aboody et al. (2003) is due to the methodology we use rather than the sample, we estimate their regression model using our data and find similar results (not tabulated for parsimony) to those reported in Aboody et al. (2003) . Specifically, disclosed volatility is not related to proxies for incentives to manage the pro-forma option expense.
future volatility, they also find that both measures contain incremental information relative to each other (e.g., Mayhew 1995) . In the context of ESO, the advantage of implied volatility over historical volatility may be smaller because the maturity of these options is considerably longer than that of traded options (from which implied volatility is derived). Still, implied volatility reflects both historical and forward-looking information relevant for the prediction of future stock-price volatility. Consequently, the incremental relationship between disclosed and implied volatilities, after controlling for historical volatility, should indicate the extent to which disclosed volatility contains forward-looking expected volatility information. To test our second research question of whether firms incorporate forward-looking information opportunistically to decrease expected volatility and thus the option expense, we estimate the following model:
Where, HI_IMP is an indicator variable that equals one when σ The draft generally requires ESOs to be accounted for using a fair-value-based method. In its Appendix B, the exposure draft lists factors that firms should consider in estimating expected volatility, including "the implied volatility of the share price determined from the market prices of traded options." 4 An alternative explanation is that differences in the level of measurement error between σ H and σ I account for differences in β 1 and β 2 . We assess empirically the validity of this alternative explanation below. behavior implies (H 3 ): β 4 > 0 and β 5 < 0. A negative β 5 means that the weight on forwardlooking information decreases when reliance on forward-looking information leads to higher disclosed volatility and thus larger option expense. An extreme version of opportunism, in which managers rely on forward-looking information solely to reduce disclosed volatility, predicts β 2 + β 5 = 0; that is, if implied volatility is larger than historical volatility, implied volatility has no effect on disclosed volatility and thus on the option expense. Finally, we observe that if firms rely primarily on historical and implied volatilities in determining disclosed volatility, the sum of the weights on these two variables should be approximately one. This implies that less weight on implied volatility (i.e., negative β 5 ) should translate into more weight on historical volatility (i.e., positive β 4 ).
We next refine hypothesis H 3 by considering the relation between managerial incentives to understate the expected volatility assumption and the opportunistic use of forward-looking volatility information. If corporate executives use forward-looking information to reduce expected volatility particularly when their incentives to report low option expense are strong, then (H 4 ): β 4 (β 5 ) will be increasing (decreasing) in a firm's incentives to understate the option expense. To investigate H 4 , we partition the sample based on proxies for management's incentives to understate the option expense, estimate Equation (2) for each subsample, and test for differences between the two subsamples.
We measure management's incentives to understate the option expense using two alternative proxies: option holdings by top executives and the industry's ESO granting intensity.
The first variable, which proxies for political costs to top executives, is measured as the ratio of the number of options held by the top five executives divided by the number of shares outstanding. This proxy is appropriate if firms exploit discretion in estimating expected volatility to mask relatively large managerial compensation awards. When using this incentives proxy, firm-year observations are classified as having strong (weak) incentives to understate the option expense if their option ratio is above (below) the sample median for that year.
We construct our second proxy to capture firms' potential concerns about the decline in earnings associated with all ESO grants. Specifically, we partition the sample into industries where ESOs are relatively immaterial and industries where options play an important role.
Based on the evidence in Huson et al. (2001, p. 597, 
Data and Variable Definitions
To perform our primary tests, we need to collect data on the three volatility measures (disclosed, historical, and implied), option holdings of executives, shares outstanding, and industry membership. To evaluate alternative interpretations of our results, we also require a measure of realized future volatility, that is, stock price volatility in a period subsequent to the options grant date. We next describe how we obtain each of these variables.
Companies disclose information about option grants to employees in the annual report, in Form 10-K, and in the proxy statement. The 10-K and annual report disclosures are prepared according to SFAS No. 123 and thus cover all option grants, with value estimates typically based on the Black-Scholes methodology. In contrast, proxy statements, issued in connection with shareholder meetings and governed by SEC regulation, contain information about option grants only to the five highest-paid executives, with value estimates based on either a formal option pricing methodology or on simple metrics reflecting the potential realizable value of the options assuming 5 percent or 10 percent annual rates of stock price appreciation. One important difference between the two approaches is that the former incorporates stock-price volatility while the latter does not. Yermack (1998) reports that essentially all firms that select a formal option pricing methodology use some variant of the Black-Scholes formula. We hand-collect the stockprice volatility assumption from Form 10-K because this source is easily accessible through the SEC's Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) database. The other variables required for our tests are obtained from two machine-readable data sources, Execucomp and Optionmetrics. Execucomp collects information from proxy statements about the compensation of the company's five most highly paid executives, and also calculates and reports statistics useful for interpreting this information (e.g., historical volatility). This data source covers a large set of firms, primarily members of the S&P 1500 (currently 2,513 distinct firms and 23,171 executives over the period 1992-2002).
We retrieve from Execucomp a measure of historical volatility (BS_VOLATILITY), which Execucomp computes using monthly returns from the previous 60 months. We also retrieve from Execucomp the required data for calculating one of our two incentives proxies, the magnitude of executive option holdings. This variable is measured as the average number of options held by executives (average of the total of UEXNUMEX and UEXNUMUN for the firm-year), divided by the number of shares outstanding (SHRSOUT).
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In addition, we retrieve from Execucomp an indicator variable called PCDCOMP, which provides information about the methodology used to value ESOs, a formal option pricing model or a simple metric assuming 5% or 10% annual stock return.
Optionmetrics provides data about implied volatilities derived from the prices of put and call options with different maturities and strike prices, for each business day during the period January 1996 through February 2003. We focus on the implied volatilities of near-the-money options and derive a unique measure of implied volatility for each firm-year observation using the following procedure. First, for each firm-year and each strike price, we obtain the implied volatilities of the call and put options with the longest maturity as of July 1 st of that year. For each type of options (call and put), we then identify the options with the strike price closest to the prevailing stock price on each side. If an exact match is found, we use that option to measure the implied volatility of the corresponding type (call or put). If not, we extrapolate from the implied volatilities of the two options, assigning weights that are inversely proportional to the distance between the stock price and the exercise price. For example, if the stock price is $42 and the two nearest call options have exercise prices of $40 and $45 and implied volatilities of 0.34 and 0.36, respectively, then we estimate the implied volatility of call options as:
. If all strike prices are on one side of the prevailing stock price, we use the implied volatility of the option with the nearest strike price. Finally, we calculate the average of the call and put implied volatilities.
The rationale for these choices is as follows. We extract data as of July 1 (mid-year) because option grants occur throughout the year (for the same reason, Execucomp measures historical volatility on July 1). We focus on the implied volatilities of near-the-money options because prior research has demonstrated that these volatilities perform better in predicting future volatility than those of deep in-or out-of-the-money options (see, e.g., Mayhew 1995 , Hull 2000 . We calculate the average of call and put implied volatilities to mitigate any measurement error induced by the Black-Scholes assumptions underlying the calculation of implied volatility.
We focus on options with the longest maturities because employee stock options have very long maturities (approximately 5 year on average according to Aboody et al. 2003) , and empirically implied volatilities vary by time-to-maturity, generally showing a declining trend. We therefore delete these two observations. Our final sample consists of 1,991 observations (547 firms).
The remaining panels of Table 1 Although σ D is highly correlated with both historical and implied volatilities, its correlation with implied volatility is smaller. This could be due to measurement error in implied volatility, or to firms' failure to incorporate forward-looking information. It could also be due to strategic reporting by firms. We next turn to the regression analysis, which allows us to examine these possibilities.
Empirical Results

DO FIRMS INCORPORATE FORWARD-LOOKING INFORMATION IN ESTIMATING EXPECTED
VOLATILITY? Table 4 presents the estimation results of Equation (1) . Finally, we note that the stability of our results across sample years indicates that a potential mulicolinearity problem due to high correlations among the independent variables is not serious.
DO FIRMS USE FORWARD-LOOKING VOLATILITY INFORMATION OPPORTUNISTICALLY?
In this section we test hypotheses H 3 and H 4 by estimating Equation (2) for the full sample, as well as for subsamples partitioned based on proxies for managerial incentives to understate the option expense. Table 5 presents the results for the full sample, and Table 6 presents the partitioned-sample results. Recall that Equation (2) is derived from Equation (1) by allowing the intercept and the slope coefficients to depend on whether implied volatility is above (HI_IMP = 1) or below (HI_IMP = 0) historical volatility. Thus, when implied volatility is smaller than historical volatility, the coefficient on historical volatility is equal to β 1 and the coefficient on implied volatility is equal to β 2 . However, when implied volatility is larger than historical volatility, the coefficient on historical volatility is equal to β 1 + β 4 and the coefficient on implied volatility is equal to β 2 + β 5 .
The results for the full sample (Table 5) reveal that when implied volatility is lower (higher) than historical volatility, firms rely heavily on forward-looking (historical) information.
Considering the pooled regression results first, when implied volatility is smaller than historical volatility, β 2, the coefficient on implied volatility (0.7079), is more than twice as large as β 1, the coefficient on historical volatility (0.2679). In contrast, when implied volatility is larger than historical volatility, β 2 + β 5, the coefficient on implied volatility, declines by approximately 85 percent (from 0.7079 to 0.1170) and turns statistically insignificant. Correspondingly, β 1 + β 4, the coefficient on historical volatility, increases dramatically from 0.2679 to 0.8682, and becomes insignificantly different from one. That is, when forward-looking information implies high future volatility, firms seem to ignore this information and instead rely exclusively on historical volatility in estimating future volatility. Accordingly, consistent with H 3 , β 4 , the coefficient measuring the differential weights on historical volatility when implied volatility is high, is positive (0.6004) and highly significant (t-statistic = 8.39), and β 5 , the coefficient measuring the differential weights on implied volatility, is negative (-0.5909) and highly significant (t-statistic = -7.49).
Examination of the six annual regressions indicates that the inferences from the pooled regression are robust. For example, the coefficient on implied volatility when it is higher than historical volatility (β 2 + β 5 ) is insignificant in each of the six years, and each of the coefficients that measure the differential weights, β 4 and β 5, has the same sign in each of the six years and is significant in most of the years. Moreover, there is no apparent time trend in any of the coefficients, suggesting that our results are unlikely to be period specific.
One way to interpret the findings thus far is that managers generally use the readily available historical volatility to estimate expected volatility, unless they have a reason to use forward-looking information. That reason, however, is not to improve on the measurement of expected volatility; rather firms use forward looking information opportunistically to lower expected volatility and thus option expense.
Does this opportunistic behavior relate to managerial incentives to understate the option expense? According to H 4 , corporate executives with strong incentives to understate option expense are more likely to incorporate forward-looking information that indicates low volatility than executives with weak incentives. To test this hypothesis, we partition the sample on the basis of two alternative proxies for managerial incentives: (1) the relative magnitude of option holdings by executives, and (2) the option granting intensity, as measured by industry membership. Table 6 presents the results. The table contains six columns; the three leftmost columns correspond to the sample partition based on executive option holdings, and the three rightmost columns relate to the sample partition based on the firm's option granting intensity.
For each of the two alternative partitions, we report estimates of equation (2) for the weak and strong incentive subsamples separately, followed in the third column by the differences in coefficients between the two regressions (labeled "High -Low").
In all four cases ("low option holdings," "high option holdings," "low option granting intensity," and "high option granting intensity"), when implied volatility is larger than historical volatility, the weight on historical volatility (β 1 + β 4 ) is close to one while the weight on implied volatility (β 2 + β 5 ) is close to zero and statistically insignificant. In addition, differences in these coefficients between firms with strong and weak incentives to understate option expense, displayed in the "High -Low" columns, are insignificant for both partitions. That is, when the use of implied volatility would lead to a larger option expense, firms ignore this information and rely exclusively on the readily available historical volatility, independent of their incentives to understate the option expense. In other words, incentives to understate option expense play little role in estimating expected volatility when implied volatility is larger than historical volatility.
In contrast, when implied volatility is smaller than historical volatility, incentives to understate option expense play an important role in estimating expected volatility. In particular, when managerial incentives are strong, firms rely primarily on implied volatilities (β 2 > β 1 in both partitions), but when managerial incentives are weak, firms only partially incorporate forward-looking information (β 1 < β 2 in both partitions). This effect of managerial incentives on the propensity to incorporate forward-looking information, which leads to low expected volatility, is economically important and statistically significant for both partitions. Specifically, for the partition based on executive option holdings the difference in β 1 between the strong and weak incentives subsamples is -0.3583 with t-statistic = -2.13, and the difference in β 2 is 0.4894 with t-statistic = 2.45. Likewise, for the partition based on option granting intensity the difference in β 1 between the strong and weak incentives subsamples is -0.5542 with t-statistic = -5.07, and the difference in β 2 is 0.5234 with t-statistic = 3.60.
Overall, the picture that emerges from our findings is that firms use the readily available historical volatility as the default value in estimating expected volatility, and incorporate forward-looking information only when doing so reduces the pro-forma option expense. In such cases, firms with strong incentives to understate the option expense rely almost exclusively on forward-looking information, while those with weak incentives only partially incorporate it.
Why do not all firms fully adjust for forward-looking information when it leads to a smaller option expense? A plausible explanation is that incorporating forward-looking information in estimating expected volatility is costly, because, among other things, it requires management to justify the departure from historical volatility to its auditors, board of directors, and possibly to users of the financial statements. Our results suggest that the benefit of incorporating forwardlooking information exceeds this cost mostly for firms with strong incentives to understate the option expense.
REALIZED VOLATILITY
Thus far we have focused on the relation between implied and historical volatility in testing whether firms manage the disclosed volatility parameter. We next use realized future volatility as a proxy for expected volatility and conduct supplementary tests which examine: (1) whether measurement error in implied and/or historical volatility provide an alternative explanation for our findings, and (2) the extent to which deviations of disclosed volatility from historical or implied volatilities can be used to identify the downward bias in disclosed volatility.
It is arguable that the results reported in Table 5 , indicating that disclosed volatility is related to implied volatility primarily when σ Table 8 presents the results for the three regressions nested in Equation (3). The estimates for Model 1 indicate that when disclosed volatility is lower than historical volatility, realized volatility is on average larger than disclosed volatility by 8.47 percent. The results for Model 2 suggest that when disclosed volatility is smaller than implied volatility, realized volatility is larger than disclosed volatility by 6.91 percent. The information in historical and implied volatilities is largely orthogonal; when disclosed volatility is smaller than both historical and implied volatilities (Model 3), it turns out to be smaller than realized volatility by 11.81 percent (7.22 + 4.59). Given that the mean value of disclosed volatility is 34.1 percent, this predictable bias is clearly nontrivial.
SENSITIVITY TESTS
Finally, we perform three types of sensitivity tests. First, to consider a possible bias that may result from the skewness of implied, historical, and disclosed volatilities, we rerun the analysis measuring all volatilities in logarithm form. Second, because we measure volatilities at the same calendar time (July 1) for all firms, the inclusion of firms with non-December fiscal year-end may introduce bias. To assess this possibility, we rerun the analyses after excluding non-December fiscal year-end firms. Third, in the primary analysis we extrapolate the implied volatilities of at the money options from options whose strike prices are around the stock price.
When the strike prices of those options are not close enough to the stock price, significant measurement error may result. We therefore rerun the analysis excluding observations where the nearest strike price is more than five percent of the current stock price. Table 9 displays the results of these sensitivity tests. Specifically, the three leftmost columns of Table 6 are replicated: (1) using logarithm form for the volatility variables rather their actual values (results in the three leftmost columns of Table 9 ), (2) excluding nonDecember fiscal year end firms (results in the middle three columns of Table 9 ), and (3) excluding strike prices more than 5 percent of stock price (results in the three right-most columns of Table 9 ). A comparison of the results indicates that the signs, magnitudes, and significance levels of all variables are robust to the alternative research-design choices.
Finally, the use of implied volatility involves at least five choices: the option's time-tomaturity, strike price, type (a call or a put), measurement date, and aggregation. In the primary analysis above, we selected to measure implied volatility as of July 1 of each year, and focus on the average value of call and put options that are near-the-money and have the longest maturity.
Due to the important role of implied volatility in this study, and the many choices involved in its measurement, it is important to check the sensitivity of the results to alternative measurement procedures. We thus rerun the analysis using the following alternative procedures in measuring implied volatility: (1) deriving implied volatilities from either call or put options (instead of using the average), (2) measuring implied volatilities as of December 31 of each year instead of July 1, (3) using options with the same time to maturity (instead of the longest maturity available), and (4) using the mean or median of all implied volatilities available in Optionmetrics. In each of these cases, the results (not reported for parsimony) are similar to those reported. This further mitigates concerns regarding potential bias from any systematic measurement error in implied volatility.
Conclusion and Discussion
To measure the value of ESO, firms are required to first derive an estimate for expected stock-price volatility. This input parameter has two characteristics: It is highly discretionary, and it has a large effect on the estimated value of ESO. Together, these two characteristics imply that if firms manipulate the option expense, they are likely to do so by managing the expected volatility parameter. Yet, previous studies that examine the disclosed stock-price volatility assumption fail to document such behavior. This result is surprising particularly because other tests (e.g., examining option expected lives) do indicate that firms manage assumptions underlying the calculation of the option expense.
Using a new methodology, we address two questions: (1) Do firms follow the guidance in SFAS No. 123 and use both historical and forward looking information in estimating expected volatility? (2) What are the determinants underlying the cross-sectional variation in firms' tendency to incorporate forward looking information into their expected volatility assumption?
We find that managers use both historical and forward-looking information in determining the expected volatility parameter, which is consistent with the literal guidance in SFAS No. 123. We also find, however, that the reliance on forward-looking information is limited to situations where it results in reduced expected volatility and thus smaller option expense. One way to interpret this finding is that managers use opportunistically the discretion with respect to estimating expected volatility afforded by SFAS No. 123. In support of this interpretation, we also find that managerial incentives play a key role in this opportunism. Managers exploit the discretion in estimating volatility primarily when their option holdings or the firm's option granting intensity are relatively large.
As a proxy for forward-looking volatility information, we use estimates of implied volatilities inferred from the prices of traded options. Thus, our evidence regarding the opportunistic use of this information by firms suggests that auditors, investors, and other users of financial statements may utilize implied volatilities as a benchmark in evaluating the appropriateness of the expected volatility parameter. Nowadays, this recommendation is rather easy to implement, given that information on implied volatilities is obtainable from independent sources in a timely and inexpensive manner (e.g., http://www.ivolatility.com). is implied volatility, calculated using the prices of traded call and put options. The regressions include fixed effects for industry-year for the pooled and industry for the year-by-year regressions, where industry is determined at the 3 digit SIC code level. and 0 otherwise. The regressions are pooled across time and include fixed effects for industry-year, where industry is determined at the 3 digit SIC code level. The sample is partitioned in two ways. First, firm-years are classified as strong incentives if their ratio of the average total holdings of options by executives to share outstanding exceeds the median across all firms in the same year. Second, firm-years are partitioned on the basis of the option granting intensity of their industry. Firms in 2-digit SIC codes in the 30s (manufacturing, partial), 70s and 80s (services) are classified as high option intensity industries as per Huson et al. (2001) . is implied volatility, calculated using the prices of traded call and put options. HI_IMP is a dummy variable that equals 1 if σ I > σ H and 0 otherwise. The regressions are pooled across time and include fixed effects for industry-year, where industry is determined at the 3 digit SIC code level. The sample is partitioned based on the ratio of average total holdings of options by executives to share outstanding.
